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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is the second appeal concerning a contract entered into between Enoch
Smith, Jr. and D. A. Osguthorpe in November, 1966. The first appeal was decided by
this Court on October 31, 2002, Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App. 361, 58 P. 3d
854 {"Smith I"). Smith and D.A. Osguthorpe had been partners in a sheep grazing
business. The 1966 agreement was intended to dissolve the partnership in accordance
with the terms contained in the agreement ("the dissolution agreement"). (Addendum 6
to Appellants' Brief.) In the prior appeal, this Court ruled that the dissolution
agreement was integrated and enforceable. Id., f 53, 58 P.3d at 865.
The dissolution agreement provided that D.A.Osguthorpe would succeed to the
assets and business of the partnership, including certain real property described by
metes and bounds. The dissolution agreement provided, however, that if the D.A.
Osguthorpe ever leased or sold that property, Smith was to receive one-half of the
proceeds in excess of an amount defined in the dissolution agreement. That provision
was to be applicable for the lives of both Smith and D.A. Osguthorpe and for 21 years
after the death of the survivor. (R. 7 - 14).
After the dissolution agreement was entered into and before this litigation began,
D.A. Osguthorpe transferred an interest in the real property ("the disputed property")
1

to the D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, of which Stephen Osguthorpe, D. A.
Osguthorpe's son, was a partner. (R. 544 - 546).
On August 14, 1996, the Osguthorpes entered into a 28 year lease agreement
with Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC (Wolf Mountain) wherein Wolf Mountain agreed to
pay $100,000 a year to lease the disputed property. (Addendum 7 to Appellants'
Brief)(R. 69). After that lease was entered into, the lease interest of Wolf Mountain
was acquired by American Skiing Company (The Canyons). On July 28, 1997, the
lease agreement was amended and The Canyons was granted the right to create roads
and ski runs on the disputed property. The Canyons agreed to work with the
Osguthorpes "in their master planning process". The annual rent under the lease was
increased to $150,000. (Addendum 8 to Appellants' Briei)(R. 71 - 72). On August
10, 1998, the lease was again amended whereby The Canyons was granted the right to
"have alpine ski operations" and to have work-access roads on the disputed property in
return for an annual lease payment increase of $50,000, making the total annual lease
payment $200,000. (Addendum 9 to Appellants' Brief)(R. 74 - 75).
This litigation was commenced in November, 1998. In response to the claims of
Enoch Richard Smith, the Osguthorpes raised a number of issues concerning the
validity of the dissolution agreement. Smith moved for summary judgment on the
question of liability only which was granted by Judge Iwasaki. (R. 202 - 209).
2

Thereafter Smith initiated discovery to determine how much had been paid under the
leases from which Smith would be entitled to recover his share. The Osguthorpes
changed legal counsel at this point in the proceedings and in their response to the
discovery requests for the first time contended that the annual payments from The
Canyons were for personal services and were not lease payments.
Thereafter the Osguthorpes filed a number of affidavits and deposition excerpts
by which they attempted to establish that the real agreement between them and The
Canyons was for personal services and not for lease payments. These are set out,
together with their record citations, in the Osguthorpes' Statement of Facts. Judge
Lwasaki ruled on a number of occasions that the lease agreement(s) (actually one lease
agreement with two amendments) were integrated agreements and the contentions of the
Osguthorpes concerning the modifications they claimed were barred by the parol
evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. (R. 606 - 607), (R. 796), (R. 952 - 953), (R.
1190- 1194).
In Smith I this Court said it could not determine from the record whether Judge
lwasaki considered the proffered parol evidence to determine as a threshold matter
whether the lease and the amendments were an integrated agreement.
"... .We therefore remand for the court to consider the parol evidence or
to make clear that it considered the parol evidence in ruling that the lease
and the amendments are integrated. If the court did not consider the parol
3

evidence, the court must consider such evidence to determine whether the
lease and the amendments are an integrated agreement to pay exclusively
for the use of the disputed property or whether the lease parties also have
an agreement for services and the appropriate allocation of damages.
(Smith I 1 45, 58 P. 3d at 863 - 864.)
"On remand the district court should make clear it considered the parol
evidence in ruling the lease and the amendments are integrated or it
should take evidence to determine if the lease and the amendments are
integrated. The district court should determine based on the lease and the
amendment terms, testimony of the parties to the lease and the
amendments, and circumstances surrounding their execution if they are
integrated. Even if the evidence offered on remand 'is uncontroverted ,
[the district] court is free to disregard such [evidence] if it finds the
evidence "self-serving and not credible."4 Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v.
Smedley, 2001 UT App 141, P24, 27 P 3d 565. Thus, we note that even
if the parties' testimony is uncontroverted, the court may determine under
the circumstances the lease and the amendments are integrated, cf. Webb,
804 P 2d at 551, and that the lease payments are for the use of the
disputed property not for services..." Id. at *{ 46, 58 P.2d at 864.
On remand, Smith again moved for summary judgment claiming that Judge
Iwasaki had considered the parol evidence in determining that the lease and the
amendments were integrated. In granting Smith's motion Judge Iwasaki stated in his
Memorandum Decision, at page 3,
Although not specifically stated, the Court finds that after reviewing the
procedural history in this matter, it is clear parole (sic) evidence was
considered in the rulings rendered in this matter. Indeed, in making its
various decisions, the Court considered the Affidavits of D. A.
Osguthorpe, Stephen Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. Moreover, the Court
heard parole (sic) evidence during oral argument, prior to rendering its
decision. In sum, summary judgement, as requested by plaintiff, is
appropriate. Further, in light of this ruling, a new judgment should be
4

entered reflecting current amounts. Plaintiff is asked to submit such a
judgment to the Court for signature. Finally, based upon the forgoing,
the Court orders the escrowed funds currently held in Zions Bank be
released. (R. 1192).
Judge Iwasaki followed the direction of this Court in Smith I and confirmed that
he had considered all of the offered parol evidence in concluding that the lease and the
amendments were integrated.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
After judgment was entered before Smith I and before any supersedeas bond had

been filed by the then appellants, Smith served a Writ of Garnishment on The Canyons.
The Canyons' answers to the Writ, dated July 18, 2001, stated that a $200,000 annual
payment would be due "pursuant to agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. and
Osguthorpes to D. A. Osguthorpe and/or Steve Osguthorpe for use of certain portions
of Osguthorpes' real property and personal services rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and
Steve Osguthorpe." (R. 820).
On August 2, 2001, the Osguthorpes filed a Reply To Answers of Garnishee
claiming that the money ASC Utah, Inc. owed was for Stephen Osguthorpe's personal
services and not for lease payments, thus traversing the Garnishment. (R. 865 - 867)
By minute entry dated August 20, 2001, Judge Iwasaki denied the motion to quash the
Writjof Garnishment and directed that the $200,000 be placed in an interest-bearing

5

account until the "matter is resolved". (R. 879 - 880). A hearing was scheduled for
October 1, 2001. A formal Order reflecting the holding of the Minute Entry was
entered September 10, 2001 and directed the $200,000 be placed with Zions Bank. (R.
888 - 890). A copy of that Order is set out in Addendum A.
In a Memorandum Decision dated October 12, 2001, following the hearing of
October 1, 2001, Judge Iwasaki stated that his prior holding that the payments due from
ASC Utah, Inc were lease payments and were not for personal services was binding on
Steve Osguthorpe because he was collaterally estopped under the test set forth in Searle
Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). Thus the defendants' Traversal of
Garnishment was denied. (R. 949 - 954). A copy of that Memorandum Decision is set
out in Addendum B.
After the remand by this Court in Smith I, Judge Iwasaki reaffirmed his prior
holding as set forth in Point A, above. Thus it was proper to release the $200,000 to
Smith. (R. 1190- 1194).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Smith objects to the Osguthorpes' "Statement of Facts" in that they

generally consist of a self serving recitation of conclusions gleaned from the various
affidavits and testimony produced by the Osguthorpes and which have been ruled
inadmissible because of the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule.
6

2.

The dissolution agreement between Enoch Smith, Jr. and D. A.

Osguthorpe is a valid, enforceable agreement. Smith I, 1 53, 58 P.3d at 865.
3.

The disputed property described in the dissolution agreement was

partnership property and was properly dealt with in the dissolution agreement. Smith I,
1122,23,24, 58 P.3d at 859.
4.

A portion of the disputed property was transferred to the D. A.

Osguthorpe Family Partnership prior to August 14, 1996. (R. 544 - 546). Stephen
Osguthorpe, D. A. Osguthorpe's son, is a partner in the Family Partnership. (R. 749).
5.

On August 14, 1996, D. A. Osguthorpe and the D. A. Osguthorpe

Family Partnership leased the disputed property to Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.
("Wolf Mountain") for a period of 28 years under a written Lease Agreement.
(Addendum 7 to Appellants' Brief)(R. 69). The annual rental was $100,000. The
Lease Agreement contains no mention of personal services to be rendered to Wolf
Mountain.
5.

Subsequent to August 14, 1996, but before July 28, 1997, The Canyons

acquired Wolf Mountain's leasehold interest in the disputed property. See Affidavit of
Blaise Carrig, at 12 (R. 761).
6.

On July 28, 1997, the Osguthorpes and The Canyons amended the Lease

Agreement of August 14, 1996, and increased the annual rental to $150,000. (R. 71 7

72). The Canyons agreed to "include the Osguthorpes in their master planning
process1* and both parties agreed to "work together in good faith and maintain open
communications." The amendment to the Lease Agreement contains no mention of
personal services to be rendered to The Canyons. (Addendum 8 to Appellants' Brief)
7.

On August 10, 1998, the Osguthorpes and The Canyons again amended

the Lease Agreement of August 14, 1996, and increased the annual rental to $200,000.
Both parties agreed to "work together in good faith and maintain open communication."
The second amendment to the Lease Agreement contains no mention of personal
services to be rendered to The Canyons. (Addendum 9 to Appellants' Brief) (R. 74 75).
8.

The Canyons has made $200,000 payments to the Osguthorpes every year

since 1998. In 1996 the payment was $100,000 as provided in the initial Lease
Agreement with Wolf Mountain. In 1997 the payment was $150,000 as provided in the
first amendment to the Lease Agreement. While the Osguthorpes have continued to
contend that the payments were for personal services and not lease paymeQts, they have
not denied that payments were made as shown. The Canyons verified that it has made
all of the payments. In its Attachment to Answers to Interrogatories to Garnishee, ASC
Utah, d/b/a The Canyons states: "ASC Utah has made all payments due under its
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contracts through August 11, 2004." It then describes payment of $200,000 per year
"to various Osguthorpe Parties". (R. 1288).
9.

The Osguthorpes are trying a different lawsuit. They have presented a

litany of affidavits and testimony that tell a story entirely different from the one this
Court and the trial court have said are the facts governing the lawsuit. The story told
by the Osguthorpes is based on materials that have been ruled barred by the parol
evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. When they deny that the payments have been
made, they do so on the erroneous assumption that the payments were made in
accordance with the statement of facts they have presented by affidavit and testimony,
the admission of which has been ruled as barred by the parol evidence rule and the
Statute of Frauds.
ARGUMENT
I

Standard of Review
Appellate courts give only limited review to a trial court determination that a

contract is integrated. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 190 (Utah App.
1997).
Pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues become the law of the case
and |nust be followed in subsequent proceedings. Thus, the lower court must

9

implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate
court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces. Id. at 185.
The appellate court in this case ordered Judge Iwasaki to make clear that he
considered parol evidence in determining that the contract was integrated, or to
consider parol evidence and make a determination about integration. Smith I. Review
is thus limited to whether the lower court complied with the mandate of the Court of
Appeal.
II

Judge Iwasaki considered in earlier proceedings the parol evidence offered
by the Osguthorpes. He has now made explicit that this evidence was
already considered.
A determination by a trial court concerning whether a document is integrated

differs from other forms of contractual interpretation. The Osguthorpes argue that
integration is a question of fact and that disputed facts preclude summary disposition.
Disputed facts do not prevent summary disposition on the question of integration. It is
the responsibility of a trial court to consider all relevant evidence to determine whether
a contract is integrated. Smith /, f41, 58 P.3d at 863. While other forms of contract
interpretation may be left for the trier of fact, it is the province of the trial judge to
determine integration. The trial court may determine integration on summary
judgment, id., and may do so in the face of disputed facts or even in the face of
uncontroverted opposing facts. Id. 146, 58 P.3d at 864.
10

indeed, this Court in Smith I directed Judge Iwasaki to make clear that he
considered the parol evidence in ruling the lease and the amendments are integrated or
to take evidence to determine integration. Id. It made that directive after cataloguing
the same evidence which the Osguthorpes now say requires a trial. Obviously, if the
Court in Smith I had felt that the evidence required a trial, it would have directed Judge
Iwasaki to conduct one. Instead, it directed him either to make clear that he had
already considered the parol evidence or to consider the parol evidence and make a
determination with respect to integration. Smith I thus disposes of the Osguthorpes'
first argument.
The Osguthorpes now ask this Court to disregard the holding of Smith I.
Specifically, the Osguthorpes ask the Court to abandon its prior statement of law in
Smith I that even if the evidence offered on remand were uncontroverted, the district
court |was free to disregard such evidence if it found the evidence self-serving and not
credible. Smith I states specifically that "even if the parties' testimony is
uncontroverted, the court may determine under the circumstances the lease and the
amendments are integrated . . . and that the lease payments are for use of the disputed
property not for services." Smith /, 146, 58 P.2d at 864,(citation omitted).
The Court is not free to disregard the legal statements of its prior decision.
Proi^ouncements of an appellate court on legal issues become the law of the case and
11

must be followed in subsequent proceedings. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945
P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997). "Horizontal stare decisis . . . requires that a court of
appeals follow its own prior decisions. This doctrine applies with equal force to courts
comprised of multiple panels, requiring each panel to observe the prior decisions of
another." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n. 3 (Utah 1994).
Judge Iwasaki did as directed by Smith L After receiving memoranda from the
parties, he conducted a hearing on June 30, 2003. He then issued the Memorandum
Decision dated July 8, 2003, which is the subject of this appeal. He said: "Although
not specifically stated, the Court finds that after reviewing the procedural history in this
matter, it is clear parole evidence was considered in the rulings rendered in this matter.
Indeed, in making its various decisions, the Court considered the Affidavits of D.A.
Osguthorpe, Stephen Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. Moreover, the Court heard parole
evidence during oral argument, prior to rendering its decision. In sum, summary
judgment, as requested by plaintiff, is appropriate." (R. 1192).
Not satisfied, the Osguthorpes filed a Motion to Revisit and/or to Clarify the
Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision. After further briefing, the trial court
issued a Minute Entry dated August 27, 2003. In it, Judge Iwasaki states that he is
persuaded that his July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision clearly follows the direction of
the Utah Court of Appeals by reviewing the procedural history of the case and stating
12

that he had considered the proffered parole evidence. "Nothing remains to be
considered." (R. 1257).
The Osguthorpes raised before Judge Iwasaki every alleged fact that they now
say provides evidence that there was no integration. Had it not been raised below, it
would not properly be part of the record on appeal. Having considered each of these
facts, Judge Iwasaki reiterated his earlier ruling that the Lease was an integrated
contract.
Judge Iwasaki's decision that the Lease and its amendments are integrated is
amply supported by the documents themselves. The original Lease is dated, describes
the land included in the Lease, identifies the parties, bears the signatures of the parties,
and was recorded. The Lease and its amendments say nothing about personal services.
Rather, they identify the land to be leased and the amount of rent to be paid. The
Lease specifically refers to the money as "rental payments". The Osguthorpes and The
Canyons amended the Lease twice. In both cases, the amendments refer to additional
land to be leased and additional payments to be made for the land. They do not refer to
additional services to be provided. In fact, in their three versions of the agreement, the
parties never included personal services as a component.
Nothing in the Lease or its amendments attempts to distinguish between the
amount to be paid for rent and the amount to be paid for personal services. A fair
13

reading of the Lease and its amendments shows them to be what they purport to be:
documents governing the lease of land over which ski runs will operate.
If there is any obligation to perform services in the Lease and its amendments,
that obligation is imposed on The Canyons, not the Osguthorpes. For example, the
first amendment gives Steve Osguthorpe the right to approve some road and lift
locations. The benefit runs to the Osguthorpes. The first amendment, paragraph 3
says "The Canyons will be able to complete the Saddleback area trail construction as
approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig." It obligates The Canyons to include
the Osguthorpes in their master planning process and to seek approval from the
Osguthorpes on any matters of change to their lands. (R. 769).
The second amendment similarly says: "Both parties agree to work together in
good faith and maintain open communication." Such a covenant inheres in every
contract, and imposes no personal services obligation on the parties. The second
amendment also specifies which property The Canyons can use and places limits on that
use. (R. 771). If The Canyons and the Osguthorpes really had an agreement for
personal services, it would have been contained in the four corners of the document. It
was not unreasonable for Judge Iwasaki to conclude that the after-the-fact testimony of
the Osguthorpes and The Canyons was less credible than the contemporaneously drawn
lease documents. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable to follow the general
14

principle that, to preserve the integrity of written contracts, courts should presume that
a writing which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is what it appears to
be. Smith 11f4l, 58 P.3d at 863, citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 664
(Utah 1985).
The Osguthorpes did not raise the integration question until after Judge Iwasaki
had already ruled on partial summary judgment. Their original argument was that the
lease was not a lease at all, but rather an easement for the use of real property. Only
after losing that argument, and obtaining new counsel, did the Osguthorpes change their
position. Now they argue that the lease was not a lease or an easement, but principally
a personal services agreement. Such testimony is self-s.erving and the trial court
properly gave it little weight. The Osguthorpes complain that Judge Iwasaki did not set
out the undisputed facts upon which he relied. Once again, the Osguthorpes fail to
distinguish between determination of integration and other forms of contract
interpretation. The case the Osguthorpes cite, Platts v. Parents Helping Parents dba
Turnabout, 947 P.2d at 663 (Utah 1997) is not an integration case. When integration is
at issue, the trial court not only may resolve factual questions, it must do so. Utah
cases require that a court consider all relevant evidence in determining integration.
Practically, it would be impossible to have summary judgment in contract cases if a
defendant could merely create a fact issue by claiming that he did not intend what the
15

contract says. The trial court serves a gate keeping function by weeding out unfounded
assertions of intention.
in

The Amount of the Judgment Has Been Correctly Calculated.
The Osguthorpes incorrectly state that the complaint in this matter asked for an

accounting as a prerequisite to a judgment. In fact, the prayer for relief asked
disjunctively for an accounting and for an award of any amounts found to be owing.
The trial court, based on the integrated lease documents, properly calculated the
amount owing and entered a judgment in that amount.
The Osguthorpes also argue that payments made to the Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe
Trust, as successor-in-interest to ownership of the disputed property cannot support the
judgment in this case. Judge Iwasaki disposed of this issue in the September 12, 2000
Memorandum Decision, which reads:
Finally Osguthorpe is obligated to pay regardless of whether the property is
owned by him, his family partnership or by his trust. Indeed, the Dissolution
Agreement states that if Osguthorpe, or his successor in interest, lease the
property in excess of $1.60 per acre, Smith "shalt share equally in the excess
rental over the $1.60 per year." Osguthorpe's Family Partnership and his Trust
are his successors.
(R. 607).
The September 12, 2000 decision was one of the rulings appealed from in Smith
L All issues raised, argued and resolved by the trial court prior to the entry of

16

judgment must be raised in an initial appeal. Failure to raise them in the initial appeal
results in a waiver of the right to raise them at a later time. DeBry v. Cascade
Enterprises, 935 P.2d 499 (Utah 1997). All of the Osguthorpes' arguments concerning
the relationship between Smith, the Osguthorpes, the Osguthorpe Family Partnership
and the Osguthorpe Trust were raised, argued and resolved before the appeal in Smith
/, but not raised there. They are waived.
The calculation of the judgment assumes that the Lease Agreement and the two
amendments are integrated. This assumption comports with the holding of the trial
court in Smith I and in the trial court's holding pursuant to remand. A schedule of the
computation of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum^C. This schedule was
submitted to the trial court in connection with Smith's Memorandum in Support of
Motion For Summary Judgment, For Modification of Judgment and For Release of
Escrowed Funds dated March 24, 2003, (R. 1146). The interest calculation in the
schedule is based on the provisions of §15-1-1(2), Utah Code. The Osguthorpes have
not objected to the mathematical computation. Their objections are predicated upon
their assumption that the Lease Agreement and the amendments are not integrated and
that the so-called "personal services" agreements described in the various affidavits,
testimony and the Restated Agreement of August 2, 2001 alter the Lease Agreement
and are not barred by the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule.
17

The attached Computation of Judgment Schedule is based on the fact that lease
payments were made to the Osguthorpes for the years 1996 (the inception of the lease)
through 2002. The Osguthorpes do not deny that The Canyons paid the money; they
simply claim that the evidence in the record is insufficient to prove it. The evidence is
sufficient. Smith garnished The Canyons in an effort to collect on his judgment. In its
Attachment to Answers to Interrogatories to Garnishee, ASC Utah, d/b/a The Canyons
states: "ASC Utah has made all payments due under its contracts through August 11,
2004." It then describes payment of $200,000 per year "to various Osguthorpe
Parties". R. 1288. Like the Osguthorpes, The Canyons attempts to slice up the
$200,000 payment among the Osguthorpes so as to reflect payment for personal
services. Because the Lease agreement was integrated, that attempt is of no legal
effect.
In addition, the Lease payments for 1996 through 1999 were described in
Defendants Answers to Interrogatories Dated March 10, 2000, evidenced by Certificate
of Service, (R. 217 - 219). The form of Judgment submitted to the trial court in Smith
I included the lease payment for the year 2000. In Defendants' Objection to Proposed
Form of Judgment, the Osguthorpes admitted the payment for the year 2000, but
contended that, since the trial court ruled that the year 2000 payment was for lease
rental only, The Canyons would demand repayment from the Osguthorpes because the
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Osguthorpes refused to provide further services. The year 2001 payment is the one
escrowed at Zions Bank.
The Osguthorpes contend they entered into a "Restated Agreement" dated
August 2, 2001 between the Osguthorpes and The Canyons whereby they attempted to
"restate" their agreement, nunc pro tunc, from 1996. Under the terms of the restated
agreement, the Osguthorpes contended that, pursuant to an appraisal, the reasonable
value of the land for lease purposes was $3,275.50 per year. The rest would be
credited for personal services. While the terms of the "Restated Agreeement" are also
barred by the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds, the Osguthorpes admitted
receiving $3,275.50 for the use of the land. Thus the $200,000 payment was made in
2002 and was properly included in the Computation of Judgment.
As pointed out above, the assertions of the "facts" presented to alter the terms of
the Lease Agreement and its amendments cannot be considered and the judgment
should stand as entered.
IV

The trial court properly released the funds held in escrow to Smith.
After Smith issued a writ of garnishment attaching a payment from The Canyons

to the Osguthorpes, the Osguthorpes filed a property bond. However, before the
property bond was accepted by the trial court and filed, Smith's garnishment captured
the 2001 payment from The Canyons. Smith claimed that because the garnishment
19

occurred before the property bond became effective, he was entitled to keep the money.
The Osguthorpes argued to the contrary. In order to forestall farther hearings on the
matter, the trial court suggested, and the parties agreed, that the garnished lease
payment be placed in an interest bearing savings account with Zions bank.
That agreement was contained in an Order of the trial court dated September 10,
2001. In it, the court ordered ASC Utah Inc., (the parent of The Canyons) to pay
$200,000 representing the payment due on August 12, 2001 into an interest bearing
escrow account at Zions First National Bank. The order also says: "The $200,000,
together with all accruing interest, will be held pending further order of this Court."
(Addendum A attached hereto.)
When Smith moved for summary judgment in 2003, he also asked that the trial
court release to him the money being held. Having disposed of the integration
question, the trial court found summary judgment to be proper and, because Smith was
entitled to a judgment exceeding $800,000, ordered that the $200,000 being held in
escrow be paid to Smith.
Although the funds were originally garnished, they were being held pursuant to
agreement and court order. When the trial court entered a new judgment against the
Osguthorpes, Smith immediately had a claim against the funds held by the court. There
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is no current stay of execution pending resolution of this appeal. It was thus proper
for the court to release those funds to the judgment creditor, Smith.
Finally, the Osguthorpes argue that they are entitled to a trial with respect to the
garnishment. Because the Lease and its amendments were integrated, there is no issue
left for trial. The money garnished was for rental of the disputed property, and release
of those garnished funds to the judgment holder was proper.
CONCLUSION
In Smith /, this Court gave the trial court specific instructions to either make
explicit that it had previously considered parol evidence in determining that the Lease
and its amendments were integrated, or to consider the parol evidence and make^a
determination on that issue. The trial court carefully reviewed the record and found
that it had already considered the parol evidence. In response to a motion to
reconsider, the trial court again reviewed the evidence to ensure that it had all been
considered. The Osguthorpes' appeal should be denied.
DATED this / ^

day of May, 2004

MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By (P^^

By/2U;{ A

Hardin A. Whitney

y

Robert G. Wing

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I certify that on the [c day of May, 2004,1 served two copies of the
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of ENOCH
SMITH, JR.,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 980911302

vs.
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual, and
D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP,

Honorable Glenn Iwasaki

Defendants.

A hearing was held in the above-captioned case, pursuant to notice, on
Plaintiffs writ of garnishment served upon ASC Utah, Inc., at 11:00 a.m. on Monday,
August 20, 2001. Plaintif was represented by Robert G. Wing, of Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler. Defendants D.A. Osguthorpe and D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership
were represented by David W. Scofield, of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters.
Garnishee Defendant ASC Utah, Inc. was represented by Shawn C. Ferrin and
Laura S. Scott, of Parsons, Behie & Latimer.

The court, having reviewed the entire file, having heard the arguments of
counsel, having proffered to it by defendants and considered the Restated
Agreement between ASC Utah, Inc and the defendants herein, as well as Stephen
A. Osguthorpe and the Dr. D A Osguthorpe Family Trust, and being full advised in
the premises,
ORDERS:
1.

That the objections raised by the defendants in their traversal of

garnishee answers to interrogatories, each and all of them, are hereby overruled and
denied.
2.

ASC Utah, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay $200,000, representing the

payment due on August 12, 2001 into an interest bearing escrow account at Zions
First National Bank, Broadway Office. The account will be established in the name
"Smith v. Osguthorpe Court block account," or such other name as satisfies the
requirements of the Bank. The $200,000, together with all accruing interest, will be
held pending further order of this Court.
3.

That the court will hold a further hearing on briefs, and not evidence, to

determine whether yet another hearing where evidence might be allowed is to take
place, on the issue of allocation of the 2001 payment from ASC Utah, inc. to D.A.
Osguthorpe and D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, in light of the interests of
Stephen A. Osguthorpe and Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust.

50748 01
F \DATA\DwsVFiles\Osguthorpe, DA\P\Order wpd
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Attn..

DONE this /J^day of-Aogostr2001
BYTH

Third District Court Judge
APPROVAL AS TO FORM

MOYLE & DRAPER

HARDIN A WHITNEY

Attorneys for Plaintiff
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

ROBERT G WING

Attorneys for Plaintiff

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER

SHAWN C FERRIN
LAURAS SCOTT

Attorneys for ASC Utah, Inc
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
j —

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ENOCH SMITH, JR.

__

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 980911302
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

Plaintiff,
vs.

Court Clerk: Janet Banks
October 12, 2001

D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual,
and D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants'

Traversal

of Garnishment.

The Court

heard

oral

argument with respect to the motion on October 1, 2001. Following
the hearing the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
In support of their position, defendants argue that in the
main action this Court decided the issue of whether the Dissolution
Agreement provided for certain payments to Enoch Smith based on the
lease of certain real property.
determine whether The Canyon's

The Court was also
(now ASC Utah, Inc.'s

asked to
("ASCU"))

original agreement with the Osguthorpes concerned the lease of the
subject

real

property.

By

contrast,

argue

defendants,

this
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garnishment proceeding does not concern the Dissolution
original

agreement

with

amendments.

Rather,

it

or the

concerns

the

indebtedness memorialized in the August 1, 2001 agreement between
ASCU

and

he

Osguthorpes

and

the

prepayment

of

the

$200,000

currently on deposit in Zions' Bank.1
Additionally, note defendants, the Court never entered a final
judgment

on the merits

in. the main

action - based

on

this

new

agreement, Stephen was not a party in the main action, and any
privity

he may

unavailing
attach

have

to

the

to plaintiff.

this prepayment

and

Osguthorpe

Family

Partnership

is

Specifically,

assert

defendants,

to

thereof-prior

to

Stephen's

portion

depleting the assets of the partnership-there would have to be a
finding that Stephen was in privity with the partnership.
Plaintiff in opposition argues Stephen Osguthorpe

seeks to

place before a jury his contention that the Lease between The
Canyon's

isn't

really

a lease

at

all, but rather

a

personal

services contract. According to plaintiffs, his attempt to do this
is barred by res judicata as this Court has already decided that
the amounts received from The Canyons are lease payments and not
payments for personal services.
In Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,691 (Utah 1978), the

x

Under the new agreement $.196,724.50 of the $200,000
aggregate annual prepayment-now deposited in Zions Bank-is
payable for services and, thus, to Steve Osguthorpe only.
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Utah Supreme Court outlined the following test to determine whether
collateral estoppel applies:
1)

Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with
the one presented in the action in question?

2)

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3)

Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the litigation?

4)

Was the issue in the first case competently, fully and fairly
litigated?
If all four elements of the test are satisfied,

estoppel bars relitigation of the same issue."

collateral

Trimble Real Estate

v, Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988).
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, focus
must

first

be turned

^Restatement

to the August

of Agreement."

1, 2001 Agreement

Specifically, the

entitled

Court notes the

following from the first paragraph of that Agreement:
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this
1st day of August 2 0 01, to be effective as of
August 14, 1996 ("Effective Date"), by and
among D.A. Osguthorpe
("Osguthorpe"), S.A.
Osguthorpe Family Partnership ("Partnership'),
D.A. Osguthorpe, as trustee of the Dr. D.A.
Osguthorpe
Trust
("Trust"),
Stephen
A.
Osguthorpe ("S. Osguthorpe") and ASC Utah,
Inc.,
a Main Corporation
("ASCU").
(Emphasis added).
While
concerns
writing

admittedly

the Court
and

this

had with

contains

terms

new

agreement

the prior

remedies

agreement-in

specifically

allocating

many

of

the

that

it is

the

annual
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payment between the use of real property and the services to be
performed

by

Stephen

Osguthorpe-it

is

nonetheless

not

a

new

agreement as evidenced by the caption ''Restatement of Agreement" as
well as the retroactive effective date of August 14, 1996.
This

retroactivity

is critical

in that the Court

in

its

September 12, 2000 Memorandum Decision (based upon the agreement in
existence at that time) held that the contractual

relationship

between the Osguthorpes and The Canyons concerns solely the lease
of land and includes no compensation for services rendered by the
Osguthorpes

to

The

Canyons.

Indeed,

this

was

explicitly

acknowledged by the Osguthorpes in their Memorandum in Support of
Defendants'' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable
Parties,

dated

September

29, 2000,

at

page

8.

In

sum,

this

satisfies the first test set forth in Searle.
Turning to the remaining elements, the Court finds there is a
final judgment on the merits2, Stephen Osguthorpe is in privity
with the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership3, and the issue was

2

See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F. 3d 1309, 1318 (10th Cor.
1997) (. . . the Kansas courts have adopted the now-majority view
regarding the pendency of appeals which provides that the fact
that an appeal is pending in a case does not generally vitiate
the res judicata effect of a judgment) (citations omitted).
3

In his Affidavit, Stephen Osguthorpe stated XXI have been
provided a copy of the Court's Memorandum Decision dated January
12, 2001, inviting me to respond to the Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the Court's Memorandum Decision thereon,
dated September 11, 2000. Although I have not been joined as a
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fully, fairly and competently litigated.
Indeed, had this new Agreement been prospective in nature
only, for example from August 1, 2001 forward, the result may have
been different.

However, as the evidence presently stands before

the Court, the matter has been ruled upon, is currently on appeal
to the Utah Court of Appeals, and is, consequently, outside this
Court's

jurisdiction.

Accordingly,

Defendants'

Traversal

Garnishment is denied.
DATED this / O

day of October, 2001.

party, because I have been in privity with a party, the family
partnership, I am willing to accede to the Court's request."
Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, Paragraph 10.
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Date of Payment
From The Canyons

Smith's
Share of
Payment

COMPUTATION OF JUDGMENT - SMITH v. OSGUTHORPE
As of April 30, 2003
years/day
Interest
Interest on
Total
to 4/30/03
Rate to
Smith's share
April 30, '03 to 4/30/03

08/14/96
08/12/97
08/07/98
08/05/99
08/14/00
08/14/01
08/14/02

$49,538.14
$74,538 14
$99,538.14
$99,538.14
$99,538 14
$99,538.14
$99,538.14

6 yr-259 dy
5 yr-261 dy
4 yr-266 dy
3 yr-268 dy
2 yr-259 dy
1 yr-259 dy
0 yr-259 dy

Total

$621,766.98

67.10%
57.15%
47.29%
37.34%
27.10%
17.10%
7.10%

$33,240.09
$42,598.55
$47,071 59
$37,167.54
$26,974 84
$17,021.02
$7,067 21

$82,778.23
$117,136.69
$146,609.73
$136,705 68
$126,512.98
$116,559.16
$106,605.35

$211,140 84

$832,907 82

